'China Becomes Red’ (Part 2)

'China Becomes Red’ (Part 2) by Claude Arpi (Author of The Fate of Tibet)

Marxist Ideology: One of the main themes of Socialist ideology as expounded by Karl Marx in The Capital is that the workers of the world constitute 'one community.’ The problem of exploitation of the proletarian class is the same the world over, therefore the 'workers of the world should unite.’ This explains that in the mind of the Chinese leaders, Revolution was never limited to the Mainland but had to spread to the so-called 'barbarians' in Outer China (Tibetans, Mongols, Turks, Manchurians, etc...) and then to the whole Asia and finally to the rest of the world. Mao’s letter to the Indian Communists quoted earlier was clear on this point: India also had to be 'liberated’.
The second feature of Marx’s theory is that there has to be a 'class struggle.’ History has only progressed through fights, struggles, conflicts between the capitalist and the socialist forces. 'Revolution is not a tea party’ Mao had warned.
While Nehru or the Dalai Lama, both adepts of the philosophy of non-violence were ready to accept many compromises to avoid struggle or conflict, the Chinese did not find anything wrong in war and struggle. Mao went as far as to tell Khrushchev that the Russians could kill half of the Chinese population, the other half would remain and would produce children again. The Russian atom bomb was therefore a mere paper tiger. Mao noted in Problems of War and Strategy: 'Some people have ridiculed us as the advocates of Omnipotence of war, Yes, we are: we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but good and is Marxist.’ based on the materialist conception of the history, Marx explained further that the driving forces of history were the material relations between classes.
It is certain that a theocratic regime like in Tibet or a democracy like in India did not fit into the references of an ideal society for Mao. Another gap between China and India (and also Tibet) was created by the mentality of their leaders. Nehru, Pannikar and their followers were philosophers, 'dreamers’, and idealists, but for Mao or Deng, only action and if necessary violent action could bring the change they were aiming at. 'The philosophers have so far only interpreted the world, the point is to change it’ Mao had said. 'It does not matter if a cat is black or white, as long it catches mice’, Deng declared once.
At the end of the Revolution, after a phase of dictatorship of the proletariat, Marx envisages a 'stateless, classless society.’ The first phase to reach this stateless society was for Mao to engulf as many countries as possible into the Chinese Empire.
Certain Indian leaders had nevertheless clearly seen the danger. The Rishi and poet Sri Aurobindo in 1949, wrote in his Postscript to The ideal of Human Unity: In Asia a more perilous situation has arisen, standing sharply across the way to any possibility of a continental unity of the peoples of this part of the world, is the emergence of Communist China. This creates a gigantic bloc which could easily engulf the whole of Northern Asia in a combination between two enormous Communist Powers, Russia and China, and would overshadow with a threat of absorption south-western Asia and Tibet and might be pushed to overrun all up to the whole frontier of India, menacing her security and that of Western Asia with the possibility of an invasion and an over-running and subjection by penetration or even by overwhelming military force to an unwanted ideology, political and social institutions and dominance of this militant mass of Communism whose push might easily prove irresistible. We shall see in subsequent chapters that some politicians like Sardar Patel, Acharya Kripalani, Dr Lohia also had clear idea of what was happening, and saw the danger for the security of India; unfortunately it was not the case with the Indian Prime Minister.
Mao Zedong made his aim repeatedly clear: 'There are two winds in the world, the east wind and the west wind’. There is a saying in China: 'If the east wind does not prevail over the west wind, then the east wind will prevail over the east wind. I think the characteristic of the current situation is that the east wind prevails over the west wind; that is, the strength of socialism exceed the strength of imperialism.’
Though these words were pronounced in 1957, for the Great Helmsman 'it was clear that for China there was no question to let the west wind prevail, it was the 'sacred duty’ of the Chinese to look which side the wind blows.’ 'Sacred duty’ to liberate Tibet, to make the East wind prevail! It was the greatest mistake of many Indian 'intellectuals’ to believe that because India was located eastwards in relation to the West, she should go at all cost with the East wind to blow away the 'Western Dominance’. From the above, it is clear that for Mao, the final goal was of supreme importance. War, struggle, death is only a part of life like eating or sleeping is. It could not by any means be a sin as for Nehru (or the Dalai Lama). General Li Chi-Min went to a similar extreme when he wrote: 'Modern Revisionists have exaggerated the consequences of nuclear war, the results will not be the annihilation of mankind. Over the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create very swiftly a civilisation thousand time higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves.’
Though many times Mao Zedong said that the 'power comes from the barrel of the gun’, in fact, he was not too attached to the 'barrel of the gun’; his main interest was the atom bomb. Most of his conflicts with the USSR in the fifties centred around the possession of the bomb. And where better than Tibet to locate sites for testing and storing nuclear missiles? Two characteristics have examplified the Chinese people during their five-thousand year history: one is their attachment to their land including what they perceive as their land and the second, obsession with power, their thirst to dominate other peoples, other nations. A third one can be added: the Chinese do not like to lose face. These characteristics explain most actions of the Chinese leadership from 1949 till today.
On one side of the Himalayas, the Indian leaders 'dreamed.’ To quote, KM Pannikar when he assumed charge as the first Indian Ambassador in Beijing in early 1950: 'The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India, representing the oldest communities in the world, are now in a position to cooperate effectively for mutual advantage and for the welfare of their people. The two sister republics of Asia, which between them contain over a third of the world’s population, can through their co-operation become a great and invincible force.’
Pannikar was thus defining the policy the Government of India would follow blindly for years and even decades: 'friendship at any cost’ with China, even at the cost of risking her own security; surrendering her buffer zone and losing large parts of her territory. Even then, Mao was planning the invasion of India.
A Planned Strategy: In February 1948, an Asian Communist Congress was held in Calcutta. It would have very important repercussions for the Asian Communist movement. Under cover of a South East Asian Youth Conference, this Congress decided a change in orientation of the revolutionary policy. The Asiatic Communist parties resolved to play a preponderant role in the struggle and 'initiate and lead violent insurrections and civil wars in the South and South East countries.’ This Conference was followed by a Second Congress of the Communist Party of India. A newly elected Central Committee condemned the Draft Constitution of India and Ranadive, the General Secretary, felt that the time was ripe for the final solution. A programme of insurrectionary activities for installing a revolutionary government was adopted. While in West Bengal, the Communist Party was banned, VK Krishna Menon, the Indian High Commissioner in London was receiving a delegation of the British Communist Party who had come to plead for the release Indian comrades.
Nehru wrote apologetically to Menon that: 'the West Bengal Government banned the Communist Party without informing us’, but he admitted that 'deliberate violence was encouraged and sabotage of security services was feared.’ The insurrections, which occurred in many places in Asia the following year, were the results of the Youth Conference decisions. For the first time, Moscow recognised the right of Beijing to direct Communist action in Asia. A co-ordination Bureau was created in Beijing which would become the nodal centre for armed struggle for national independence movements of Asian countries. In the Conference Manifesto the aims of the struggle were clearly indicated: 'the popular masses of all the south-east Asian nations will create zone of guerrilla and the liberated zones will be organised and in turn will spread the communist struggle.’ The struggle was later to spread to the cities. The case of Vietnam was given as an example. The history of Maoist’s China, is a tale of well-planned and well-executed moves. All the events from 1949 onwards, have been unfolded in a perfectly calculated sequence: the invasion of Tibet in 1950; after a very vague protest of the Indian Government and the adjournment of the Tibetan Appeal to the UN (at India’s instance), the 1951 Sino-Tibetan 'Agreement’ (forced under duress on the Tibetans); then the 1954 'Panchshila’ Policy (neutralising India under the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai bluff); the first incursions on Indian soil at the end of the fifties; the crushing of the Tibetan revolt in 1959, and finally the 'teaching of a lesson’ to India in October 1962. Mao was a great strategist and he never forgot what his final goal was; it was therefore wrong for Nehru and his advisors to talk about 'surprise’ and 'betrayal’. The Indian leaders only fooled themselves into believing the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai doctrine when the Chinese aims were always clear, loud and publicly announced.
Strategic Location: It is stated by Ginsburg in his study on Communist China and Tibet that 'he who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piemond; he who dominates the Himalayan piemond, threatens the Indian sub-continent; and he who threatens the Indian sub-continent may well have all the Southeast Asia within its reach, and, all of Asia.’ Mao, the strategist knew it very well, the British also knew it and had always managed to manoeuvre to keep Tibet an 'autonomous’ buffer zone between their Indian colony and the Chinese and Russian empires. The Government of India, inheriting of the past Treaties of the British, should have worn the British mantle with its advantages for Indian security and its sense of responsibility vis-à-vis Tibet, unfortunately in fear of looking a neo-colonialist state, they failed without thought to the consequences which would follow.
The strategic position of Tibet became even more visible when China joined the restricted circle of the nuclear nations. Is there a more ideal place than the Tibetan high plateau to station intercontinental missiles with nuclear heads, pointing towards India and Soviet Union?
Other Factors: Some other factors have to be taken into account to fully understand subsequent events. Apart from Marxist ideology, another point is the leadership of Asia. The Chinese believed that they had traditionally been a leader in Asia. The fact that Nehru also postulated to the leadership of Asia, antagonised the Chinese against him. The Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 in Delhi and again in 1949, a Conference on Indonesia, saw Nehru take the initiative for the leadership of Asia. The Chinese were not long to reply: In his assumption of the role of the vanguard in the international gamble against people of Asia, Nehru has committed a series of malicious intrigues, all following the victorious march of the liberation movement of the Chinese people. As early as the days prior to India’s independence, Nehru had called the Pan-Asian Conference....Early in 1949, Nehru called another Asian Conference in New Delhi, outwardly with the motive of mediating in the Indonesian dispute, but actually for undertaking a preliminary discussion of South-east Asian alliance. On February 28, 1949, Nehru nominally to mediate in the Burmese civil war, called a conference of the British dominions, the real purpose of which was to discuss the strengthening of measures for the Anti-Communist alliance in Southeast Asia.... and so up to the recent act of Nehru in serving as the hireling of Anglo-American imperialism in the attempt to invade Tibet.
For the Chinese Communists, India and her leader Nehru was first of all a rival for leadership of Asia; there is no doubt that most of the positions taken by Nehru and his subsequent actions were dictated by his ambition to lead Asia and the 'non-aligned’ nations. He built an image as a modern-thinking leader with his frequent visits abroad. His offers of mediation in many conflicts such as Korea helped in promoting this image. Many newly free nations, especially from Asia, started looking to India as their advisor, their guide and protector. This role was not acceptable to the Chinese leaders.
We have seen that throughout history, the Chinese had always displayed a superiority complex; after all, the Middle Empire was the 'centre of the world’ and the idea of India trying to play 'their’ role was not tolerable for the Communists. What a weak and corrupt Nationalist regime could accept in the forties was not tolerable for the Communist leaders. The 'coup’ of Tibetan 'liberation’ was a master stroke. It demonstrated to the world who was the real leader of Asia, while showing that India was incapable of defending a smaller country, and thus Nehru was only a 'paper tiger.’ Ideologically the 'liberation’ of Tibet meant that the Marxist theory could spread to another 'feudal’ country, it was a real 'liberation’ in Marxist terms.
Furthermore, China was establishing her de facto suzerainty over Tibet, which had been lost many decades ago. It was the first step towards the South, the opening of the gate to India and to other countries that China was claiming as hers (Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, etc). It should not be forgotten that Mao had termed Tibet the palm of the hand and the five fingers were Ladakh, Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and NEFA. Accusing someone of a crime that you are going to commit is also very typical of the Chinese mentality and tactics. Attack being the best form of defence, a few months before the 'liberation’, the Chinese propaganda was speaking of: 'the recent act of Nehru in serving as the hireling of Anglo-American imperialism attempt to invade Tibet.’ The Government of India followed a strange policy of appeasement. The harder they were attacked or insulted, the harder they tried to appease the Chinese and become their friends. The Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai slogan was the consequence of this movement. Each time China made a step forward, India bent backward to appease Chinese susceptibilities. Another strange stand of the Government of India was the dual standards taken by Nehru; he backed the defence of Indonesia and Algeria and in similar circumstances, refused to do anything for the Tibetan case when his own borders were threatened. Another fact which explains the motivation of Communists leaders in invading Tibet, was the lebensraum needed by the fast-increasing Chinese population. A few figures explain the problem. The policy of the Chinese Government to send settlers in the 'Provinces’ or 'Autonomous Regions’ started very early. By 1987, 75 millions Han Chinese had settled in Manchuria. In Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) 7 millions Hans settled in an area where only 200 000 Hans lived in 1949.
In Inner Mongolia, the settlers have outnumbered the Mongols (8,5 millions for 2 millions) while in Tibet, the Han population is today estimated at 7 millions to which the 500,000 troops of the Liberation Army should be added, making the Tibetans a minority in their own country. In an article entitled A vast sea of Chinese settlers threatened Tibet, the Dalai Lama wrote: 'The area where I was born, the Kokonor region of north-eastern Tibet, now already has a population of 2.5 million Chinese and only 700,000 Tibetans, according to recent Chinese newspaper reports. The Chinese claim to be giving special care and attention to the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, which comprises only the western and central parts of Tibet, but they are sending large numbers of young Chinese colonists into eastern and north-eastern parts of our country.’
We should also point out that the Communist Party in China has 'grown up as an army and not a civilian organisation like any other communist party.’ Mao’s strength was in the People Liberation Army, 'military virtues and military men have been elevated to a position of new prestige in the Chinese Society, and the population of the country has been fully mobilised to support the military establishment.’
Till recently, the army has been the main pillar of the Communist regime and it is only because of the conservative elements of the Liberation Army that in 1989, the hard-liners were able to win over and crush the student movement and keep alive the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the revolution, China had the largest army in the world and was it not in Mao’s interest to keep this army busy?
'Liberation’ tasks had to be given to the army and Tibet was an ideal job. Strategically the next steps in the Marxist Revolution could be prepared and ideologically Mao and his colleagues were liberating a feudal 'province’ poisoned by their beliefs in the 'opium’ of religion and under servitude by 'a clique of lamas’. Before the curtain rises on 1950, the 'Fateful Year’, it can be said that India despite her good intentions, her non-violent and non-aligned policy, had not been able to prepare the country with the necessary strength to convert her ideals into a possible concrete reality.
Claude Arpi is a French dentist tuned Tibetologist living in India. He is also the author of 'The Fate of Tibet’ and an advisor to Friends of Tibet (INDIA)